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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities regulation is an area of the law in which existing rules
are being rendered obsolete by technological developments. More and
more securities activities in both the primary and the secondary mar-
kets are moving on-line these days. However, the rules for regulation
of such activities were drafted before the dawning of the computer age
and do not adequately cover the novel issues raised by securities issu-
ance and trading in an electronic world. While the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") and state securities regulators have
begun to address the consequences of use of the new medium by issu-
ers, intermediaries, and investors, many basic questions remain
unasked and unanswered by such regulators.'
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
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1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World? The Impact(s) of the Internet on Mod-
ern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAw. 1195 (1997) (outlining the major issues
raised by use of the Internet).
SECURITIES FRAUD IN CYBERSPACE
While use of the Internet for securities transactions has been
praised for the convenience and lowered costs it affords, the Internet
has also served as a breeding ground for fraudulent activity. Internet-
related stock fraud is now one of the most common types of investment
fraud.2 Realizing the ease with which such fraud can occur, the SEC
identified combating such fraud as a priority and set up the Office of
Internet Enforcement ("OIE") in 1998, which has brought over 200 en-
forcement actions. 3
Despite its recognition of the scope of the fraud problem and its
willingness to take steps to put special enforcement mechanisms into
place, the SEC has not publicly proposed any changes to the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws or SEC regulations tailored to
this new form of fraud. To the contrary, the highest ranking SEC offi-
cials have taken the position that Internet fraud does not require the
enactment of new statutes or the promulgation of new regulations.
Former Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement Richard Walker
stated that such fraud, although perpetrated through new means of
electronic communication, is essentially of the same type as tradi-
tional securities fraud and can be prosecuted under existing laws and
regulations. 4 Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt compared the pro-
visions of the federal securities laws to those of the U.S. Constitution
in their ability to remain relevant in spite of societal change, conclud-
ing that it is unnecessary for the SEC "to pronounce a totally new and
radical scheme of regulation specifically tailored to on-line investing."5
2. Hearing on Sec. Fraud on the Internet Before the Sen. Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (testi-
mony of Peter C. Hildreth, President, North American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc.) (stating that Internet securities fraud is the second most com-
mon type of investment fraud), at http'J/www.nasaa.org (last visited May 31,
2002).
3. See SEC Internet Enforcement Program, About the Office of Internet Enforce-
ment, at http'J/www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/internetenforce.htm (last visited
May 31, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Internet Enforcement Program].
4. Richard Walker, A Bull Market in Securities Fraud?, Speech at the National
Press Club, (Apr. 5, 1999), at http:J/wvw.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1999/spch265.txt (last visited May 31, 2002); see also Judith R. Starr & David
Herman, The Same Old Wine in a Brand New Bottle: Applying Traditional Mar-
ket Manipulation Principles to Internet Stock Scams, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 236, 239
(arguing that Internet scams involving stock manipulations can be prosecuted
under existing law in view of the SEC Division of Enforcement); Richard H.
Walker & David M. Levine, "You've Got Jail: Current Trends in Civil and Crimi-
nal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 Ai. Cani. L. REv. 405, 429
(2001) (concluding that existing prohibitions sufficiently cover the misconduct of
today).
5. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Plain Talk About On-Line Investing, Speech at the
National Press Club, (May 4, 1999), at http'//www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchivel1999/spch274 (last visited May 31, 2002).
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This view cannot be maintained in the long-term because it fails to
take into account the unique characteristics of the new communica-
tions medium that is the Internet. A complete overhaul may be un-
necessary, but some revisions are critical. While the SEC's position on
this matter may serve the agency's interests, its strategy makes for
bad law, stretching existing provisions to reach these new cases by
using flawed reasoning. 6 A new approach that takes into account the
differences between traditional securities transactions and those that
take place in cyberspace needs to be devised and implemented. 7
Recent SEC enforcement actions involving Internet fraud involve a
variety of fact patterns, but share certain common characteristics and
can be categorized. One category involves so-called "cyberhype," in-
cluding "pump and dump" schemes, in which the stock of small compa-
nies, often microcap stocks, are promoted for profit over the Internet
through the use of unsolicited e-mail "spain," chat rooms, bulletin
boards, investment websites, or investment newsletters. Such activity
may involve fraud if the promoter makes material misrepresentations,
fails to disclose its intention to dispose of its stock at a profit into the
rising trading market that develops after such promoter's recommen-
dation, or fails to disclose that it promoted the stock for compensation.
This Article will focus on a recent case involving a subcategory of such
scams, namely the use of investment websites and on-line investment
newsletters to generate interest in a stock, as an example of the fail-
ure of pre-cyberspace law to adequately address the new world of on-
line securities fraud. In the first and most widely-publicized action of
this type, the SEC sued Yun Soo Oh Park, a/k/a Tokyo Joe ("Park" or
"Tokyo Joe"), who operates a popular investment website called Tokyo
Joe's Societe Anonyme ("S.A.") frequented by day traders.8 This case,
6. Richard Walker has advocated using the enforcement process to combat Internet
securities fraud on a case-by-case basis rather than adopting new regulations.
His stated reasons include the ability to respond quickly to new types of fraud
without the need for engaging in a lengthy rule-making, the dangers of promul-
gating rules that are both over-and under-inclusive, and the unwillingness to re-
open issues resolved by the courts. Richard Walker, Regulation vs. Enforcement
in an On-Line World, Speech to Bond Market Association (Oct. 25, 2000), at http./
/www.sec.gov/news/speechlspch4l3.htm (last visited May 31, 2002). It is also
possible that the SEC prefers an ad hoc enforcement approach rather than
promulgating rules, or seeking amendments to the statute, to avoid conflicts with
industry groups opposed to new regulation.
7. SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt announced, prior to his confirmation, that he will
undertake a broad review of federal securities laws to simplify and modernize
them. He did not refer specifically to antifraud provisions relating to the In-
ternet. See Shannon Murray, SEC Nominee Vows to Update Securities Law, at
http:J/www.law.com (last visited May 31, 2002).
8. See SEC v. Yun Soo Oh Park a/k/a Tokyo Joe and Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme
Corp., No. 00C 0049 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2000), SEC Litigation Release No. 16,399, at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Ir16399.htm. The SEC subsequently
brought other similar actions, including SEC v. DynamicDaytrader.Com L.L.C.
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which was settled after pre-trial litigation, offers interesting insights
into the legal theories used to support the SEC's enforcement proceed-
ings in this area. This Article will argue that such theory, based upon
the existing antifraud provisions of the securities laws, is inadequate
to deal with this new type of securities fraud in a coherent manner.
Revised measures that take into account the nature of cyberspace
transactions are needed to ensure that the securities regulatory
scheme provides greater certainty and adequate notice to market
participants.
This paper is organized as follows. Part II examines the growing
phenomenon of Internet securities fraud and the SEC enforcement
program initiated to combat it. Part III critiques the Tokyo Joe en-
forcement action as an example of the confused jurisprudence that
may develop when pre-cyberspace laws are used to prosecute alleged
fraud involving Internet investment advisers and points out the need
for reform. Part IV argues that securities fraud in cyberspace must be
treated differently than securities fraud involving conventional com-
munication media and proposes an alternative regulatory model for
the new breed of online advisers that takes such differences into
account.
II. THE RISE OF SECURITIES FRAUD ON THE INTERNET
AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE
A. The Impact of the Internet on the U.S. Securities
Markets
The wedding of advances in information technology with the deliv-
ery of financial services is a marriage made in cyberheaven. The in-
formation superhighway called the Internet is ideally suited to
facilitate the exchange of company, market, and product facts that
form the lifeblood of the financial services industry.9 It does so with
speed and accuracy, making available up-to-date, and in some cases,
real-time information about the markets that, in the case of individual
investors, would be otherwise unavailable or more difficult to obtain.1O
and DavidA Rudnick, CA., No. 00-85-PC (D. Me. Mar. 20,2000), SEC Litigation
Release No. 16,475, at http'J/www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16475 (last vis-
ited Aug. 9, 2001) and SEC v. Thomas E. Loyd, No.CA-00-CV-1085 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2000), SEC Litigation Release No. 16,495, at http-//www.sec.gov/litiga-
tion.litreleases/lr16495.
9. An outgrowth of a communication and resource sharing instrument for advanced
research scientists in government and academia called 'ARPANET, the Internet
today is a decentralized network of computer networks that can be accessed by
anyone with a computer terminal and an Internet service provider connection.
See JOSEPH KIZZA, CIVILIZING T=E IrTERNET 1-13 (1998).
10. See Special Study: Online Brokerage: Keeping Apace of Cyberspace (Report of
Laura S. Unger, SEC Commissioner) (1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
cyberspace.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter Unger Report].
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The use of information technology in the securities industry is per-
vasive.ii Issuers file required disclosures with securities regulators
electronically and use the Internet to keep shareholders and potential
investors informed about financial performance and recent develop-
ments. Investment advisers and broker-dealers are making required
disclosures through electronic means also, as well as providing infor-
mation about their services and investment information to customers
through their own websites.i 2 The stock exchanges and the NASDAQ
use electronic systems for order delivery and automatic quotation.3
In addition, both primary and secondary market transactions are
moving online in rapidly increasing numbers. Securities offerings are
taking place over the Internet.' 4 Many brokerage houses now offer
on-line trading services for investors.i5 While the statistics vary de-
pending upon the source, there is a consensus that the use of the In-
ternet in the securities industry is significant, especially in the area of
retail brokerage transactions by individuals.16
11. Since 1984, the SEC has permitted filing of disclosure documents under the 1933
Act, the 1934 Act, and the Investment Company Act of 1940 electronically
through the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval ("ED-
GAR") system. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, SEC Release
No. 33-7233, at 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-7233.txt [hereinafter
1995 SEC Release]. After 1996, all domestic registrants were required to file elec-
tronically through EDGAR. Issuers are also permitted to deliver disclosure docu-
ments to investors, including prospectuses, annual reports, and proxy solicitation
materials, through electronic means subject to certain conditions. Id.; see also
SEC Release No. 33-7856, at http:www.sec.gov/ruleslinterp/34-42728.htm (updat-
ing earlier guidance on use of electronic media for document delivery and discuss-
ing issuer's liability for website content) [hereinafter 2000 SEC Release].
12. Investment advisers are required to file electronically using the Investment Ad-
viser Registration Depository (IARD) system to fulfill both SEC and state securi-
ties regulation requirements. See SEC, Electronic Filing for Investment Advisers
on LARD: What Is IARD?, at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investmentliard/
about.shtml (last visited May 31, 2002). They may also fulfill their disclosure
delivery requirements to customers under certain provisions and rules of the IAA
electronically subject to certain conditions. Use of Electronic Media by Broker-
Dealers, Transfer Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery Information,
SEC Release No. 33-7288 at 8, at http//www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7288.txt
[hereinafter SEC 1996 Release]. Broker-dealers may satisfy their obligations to
deliver information to customers under certain 1934 Act rules electronically sub-
ject to certain conditions. Id. at 7-8.
13. See 1995 SEC Release, supra note 11, at 3.
14. See 2000 SEC Release, supra note 11, at 2.
15. See Unger Report, supra note 10, at 12; Investor's Guide 2000: They Want You
Wired!, http://www.fortune.com/fortune/1999/12/20/rou.html (Dec. 20, 1999).
16. According to the SEC, more than one in three trades by retail investors took place
online as of 1999. Unger Report, supra note 10, at 12. Former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt reported to Congress that there will be close to 5.5 million domestic
online brokerage accounts by the end of 2000 and 20 million are expected by
2003. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001, Testi-
mony at the Senate Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary,
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While many praise the use of the new technology in the securities
markets, securities regulators, like unwelcome wedding guests who
step forward to explain why the bride and groom should not be joined
together, have begun to voice their reservations. Many of the same
characteristics that make the Internet a useful tool for providing in-
formation are problematic when viewed from the perspective of the
agencies charged with enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws. Vast amounts of detailed information can be trans-
ferred rapidly to a huge international audience at very little cost to
the sender.17 Information on the securities markets is disseminated
over the Internet in several ways, including the use of web pages con-
trolled by a single entity or individual and accessed by many readers;
bulletin or message boards on which information may be posted anon-
ymously by many individuals who have access to it; e-mail messages
that can be sent to a wide audience on an anonymous basis; and so-
called "push" technologies that disseminate information to individuals
who are on-line without their having accessed a website or bulletin
board devoted to securities markets.1 S While much of the information
supplied stems from legitimate sources and is accurate, some of it does
not and may be false or misleading. The technology is so cheap and
easy to use that perpetrating a fraud can be a virtual cakewalk; even
high school and university students have been prosecuted for commit-
ting stock frauds over the Internet.' 9 Finally, the size of the potential
audience for Internet frauds is much larger than those perpetuated
through use of traditional communications media, thereby magnifying
the impact of any particular fraudulent scheme.
Distinguishing fact from fiction in this environment is often diffi-
cult for recipients of electronic information over the Internet. This is
attributable to at least three factors. First, there is no gatekeeper or
other screening device available on the Internet to keep out false in-
Comm. on Appropriations, at http'//www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts052000.htm
(last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter Levitt 2000 Testimony].
17. See International Organisation of Securities Commissioners ("IOSCO"), Techni-
cal Committee, Report on Enforcement Issues Raised by the Increasing Use of
Electronic Networks in the Securities and Futures Field, at http://www.iosco.org/
docs-public/1997-reportonenforcement_issues.html (last visited May 31, 2002)
[hereinafter IOSCO 1997Report]. As of 1997, IOSCO estimated that the Internet
was being used by 50 million people in over 23 million households. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 3-4.
19. See S.E.C. v. Douglas W. Colt, No. 1:00CV00423 (D.C.D.C. Mar. 2, 2000), SEC
Litigation Release No. 16,461, at http'//www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr16461.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Lit. Release 16,461];
S.E.C. v. Mark S. Jakob, No. EDCV-00-687 (C.D. Cal. 2000), SEC Litigation Re-
lease No. 16,671, at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16671.htm (last
visited May 31, 2002); In the Matter of Jonathan G. Lebed, Order Instituting
Cease-and-Desist Proceeding, Making Findings and Imposing Cease-and-Desist
Order and Other Relief, No. 3-10291 (SEC 2000), SEC Release No. 33-7891, at
http//www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7891.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
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formation about securities at the present time. Although Internet ser-
vice providers, as the link between users and the Internet, have the
ability to monitor both users and content, they do not verify the accu-
racy of the information that is being transmitted.20 Second, it may be
difficult or impossible for the viewer to verify the identity or creden-
tials of the sender. Internet users may employ various tools to conceal
their identity and remain anonymous. 2 1 These include use of a
remailer site or anonymizer software that obscures the sender's iden-
tity by acting as a middleman. Other tools permit users to imperson-
ate others and to alter or falsify e-mail messages. Use of such
techniques means that the true identity of individuals or entities us-
ing the Internet may be masked and information transmitted by a sin-
gle individual or entity can be retransmitted in a manner that makes
it appear to emanate from several different sources. These features
create special problems for enforcement agencies which are surmount-
able as long as the anonymous senders are traceable.22 Third, the
sender may deliberately confuse the recipient by inserting a hyperlink
to a legitimate source of information, such as a regulatory agency's
web page or a well-known newspaper or news service, giving a fraudu-
lent message the appearance of legitimacy.23 The risk that investors
will be unable to spot scams over the Internet increases the likelihood
that securities fraud will occur.
B. The SEC Enforcement Program for Internet Fraud
The SEC has recognized the importance of technology and taken
steps to address the impact of the Internet on regulation of the securi-
ties markets.24 Most emphasis has been given to the problem of com-
bating Internet fraud, a course of conduct identified as a high-level
priority for the SEC by former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt.25 The
antifraud program consists of two main elements: enforcement pro-
ceedings and investor education. 2 6 Such activities are handled
through the OIE, which administers the Enforcement Division's In-
20. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1225-1227 (discussing the gatekeeper function and
monitoring problem in this context and lack of legal obligations by online services
to perform such monitoring).
21. See IOSCO 1997 Report, supra note 17, at 5-6.
22. Relevant considerations include whether data is maintained by service providers
and whether regulators may compel discovery of such records under applicable
rules. See id. at 7-8.
23. See id. at 5.
24. For significant SEC studies on the impact of technology, see The Impact of Tech-
nological Advances on the Securities Markets (SEC Report to Congress) (1997), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) [here-
inafter SEC 1997 Report]; Unger Report, supra note 10.
25. See Levitt 2000 Testimony, supra note 16, at 2.
26. See id. at 4-5.
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ternet program and coordinates the activities of the SEC "cyberforce,"
a group of some two hundred attorneys, accountants and investigators
who conduct Internet surveillance.2 7 The OIE also runs an online
complaint center for the Enforcement Division, which receives reports
of Internet fraud from the public.28 Finally, the SEC staff has issued
several investor bulletins warning of the pitfalls in on-line investing,
day-trading, and microcap stock trading.29
To date, the OE has conducted five Internet fraud sweeps, which
have resulted in more than 200 Internet-related enforcement actions,
naming over 750 individuals and entities. 30 These actions have in-
volved several types of securities fraud, with some actions involving
more than one type of offense. There are three main types of Internet
securities fraud, namely market manipulation, including pump and
dump schemes; offering frauds consisting of promises of high returns
with no risk disclosure; and illegal touting.3 1
All of these enforcement actions have been brought under existing
securities statutes and regulations used as the basis for such enforce-
ment proceedings. The SEC has neither amended nor sought to
amend any antifraud provision or regulation using both fraud and
market manipulation theories of liability. This is in marked contrast
27. See SEC Internet Enforcement Program, supra note 3.
28. See id.
29. See SEC, Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet Investment Scams, at http//
www.sec.gov/mvestor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm (last visited May 31, 2002); SEC,
Microcap Stock:A Guide for Investors, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/micro-
capstock.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
30. See SEC Charges 23 Companies and Individuals in Cases Involving Broad Spec-
trum ofInternet Securities Fraud, SEC News Release No. 2001-24 (Mar. 1, 2001),
at http'J/www.sec.gov/news/headlines/internet5.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
Detailed accounts of the focus and results of the other four sweeps can be found at
SEC Continues Nationwide Crackdown Against Internet Fraud, Charging 33
Companies and Individuals with Fraud for Manipulating Microcap Stocks, SEC
News Release 2001-124 (Sept. 6, 2000), at http'J/www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-
124.txt (last visited May 31, 2002); SEC Steps Up Nationwide Crackdown
Against Internet Fraud, Charging 26 Companies and Individuals for Bogus Se-
curities Offerings, SEC News Release 1999-49 (May 12, 1999), at httpJ/
www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1999/99-49.txt (last visited May 31, 2002);
SEC Charges 82 Individuals and Companies in Second Nationwide Microcap
Fraud Sweep, SEC News Release 1999-20 (Aug. 3, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/headlines/micro899.htm (last visited May 31, 2002); SEC Charges 44 Stock
Promoters in First Internet Securities Fraud Sweep, SEC New Release 1998-117
(Oct. 28, 1998), at http'/www.sec.gov/news/headlines/netfraud.htm (last visited
May 31, 2002).
31. See SEC Commissioner Laura Unger, Empowering Investors in an Electronic
Age, Speech (May 17, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch380.htm (last
visited May 31, 2002). The litigation releases for these enforcement proceedings
are posted on the SEC website. See SEC Internet Enforcement Program, supra
note 3. Current news reports on SEC enforcement activities and trends are also
posted on the EnforceNet.com website, at http'//enforcenet.comEnforceNet/in-
dex.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
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to another area of securities regulation, namely the registration, fil-
ing, and disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws, where
the SEC has amended certain regulations, among other regulatory ac-
tions, to take account of the distinct nature of the Internet. 32 The
SEC's approach to Internet fraud, however, fails to take into account
the adequacy of existing laws to address the special problems associ-
ated with such fraud.
This approach is inconsistent in one important respect with the
prevailing federal agency standards for approaching Internet fraud.
The SEC participated in the Clinton Administration's Working Group
on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet ("Internet Working Group"),
which recommended a three part program for dealing with unlawful
conduct on the Internet, namely 1) development of a regulatory policy
framework that treats online conduct in a manner consistent with
treatment of offline conduct and takes privacy and civil liberties con-
cerns into account, 2) an emphasis on increased enforcement activi-
ties, and 3) a focus on investor education to prevent and minimize the
risks of unlawful conduct.3 3 The SEC's program seems to comport
with the second and third recommendations, but falls short with re-
spect to the first recommendation. The Internet Working Group's re-
port noted that if existing laws adequately cover unlawful conduct in
the offline world, they should adequately cover unlawful conduct in
cyberspace, although in some cases relevant federal laws may need to
be amended to "better reflect the realties of new technologies, such as
the Internet. 34 As the next two sections of this Article will argue,
Internet securities fraud is an area where changes are clearly needed.
The SEC approach also does not conform fully to the prevailing
international standard for similar reasons. The SEC is a member of
IOSCO, an international organization composed of securities regula-
tors and self-regulatory organizations from approximately 100 coun-
tries, which has studied the issue of Internet securities activity
extensively. 3 5 It has developed five key principles that regulators
should consider when formulating policies regarding Internet securi-
ties activities, including the principle that the fundamental policies
32. See SEC 1997 Report, supra note 24, at app. B.
33. See President Clinton's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet,
The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving Use of the
Internet (Mar. 9, 2000), at 58-60, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ap-
pend.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter Electronic Frontier].
34. See id. at 59.
35. See IOSCO, Technical Committee, Securities Activity on the Internet (1998), at
http'//www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-internetsecurity.html (last visited May
31, 2002) [hereinafter IOSCO 1998 Report); IOSCO, Report on Securities Activity
on the Internet II (2001), at http'//www.iosco.orgdocs-pubHc-2000/2001-securi-
tiesactivityinternet.html (last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter IOSCO 2001
Report].
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underlying securities regulation-protection of investors, ensuring
that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent, and reducing sys-
temic risk-should also govern Internet-based activities. 36 While
IOSCO believes that the existing regulatory framework developed to
help investors can generally be adapted to securities transactions over
the Internet, it recommends that regulators review the existing frame-
work to ensure there are no legislative or regulatory gaps.37 While
the SEC takes the position that there are no gaps, the case of Tokyo
Joe, the flamboyant king of the day traders, will be used to illustrate a
flaw in the existing regulatory framework for Internet securities
fraud.
III. THE CASE OF TOKYO JOE: WHY THE EXISTING
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK DOES NOT WORK38
When the SEC filed its complaint against Tokyo Joe and S.A. in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Janu-
ary 2000, the website had been in operation for only a year and a half,
but had already attracted several thousand subscribers and Park had
36. The other four principles are the following: 1) regulators should not impede the
legitimate uses of the Internet by market participants and markets, 2) regulators
should strive for transparency and consistency in application of regulations; 3)
regulators should cooperate with regulators in other jurisdictions; and 4) regula-
tors should remain flexible in their approach because technology will continue to
evolve. IOSCO 1998 Report, supra note 35, at 27-29.
37. See id. at 27.
38. In spite of the widespread use of technology in the securities industry, there is
currently very limited academic literature on the structure of securities
regulation and the Internet. Noteworthy exceptions include Coffee, supra note 1
HowARD M. FRIEDMAN, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE (1997); Tamar
Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
Rsv. 1319 (1998); Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic
Activity in the Age of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REv. 521 (1998). For an early
treatment of the impact of information technology developments on the structure
and regulation of securities markets, see Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 747
(1985). The problems associated with Internet securities fraud are discussed in
Joseph F. Cella III and John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet:
Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium, 52 Bus. LAw. 815 (1997); John C.
Coffee, Tokyo Joe and the First Amendment, N.Y. L.J., 5 Jan. 20, 2000, at col. 1;
Charles R. Mills, Enforcement Program Against Internet Publishers Tests Limits
ofInvestment Advisers Act, 3 No. 9 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec. Age 1 (2000);
Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities
Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1 (1998); Starr & Herman, supra note 4;
Walker & Levine, supra note 4; Judith R. Starr & David Herman, The Same Old
Wine in a Brand New Bottle: Applying Traditional Market Manipulation
Principles to Internet Stock Scams, 29 SEc. REG. L.J. 236 (2001).
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collected over a million dollars in membership fees. 39 He began his
career as an online stock trading guru after posting e-mail messages
on bulletin boards run by Silicon Investor and Raging Bull. Investors
who were impressed by his postings began to contact him directly for
stock picks, which he initially made available for free via e-mails, but
later for fees that increased over time through his website.40
Park's website, then as now, has both a publicly accessible area
and a members-only area. The public area is directed towards recruit-
ing new subscribers and contains information about membership.
Members have access to a message board and receive multiple daily e-
mails from Park containing stock picks, market news, and trading
tips. 4 1 They also have access to a chat room in which Park and mem-
bers discuss the markets and stocks they are currently trading, ex-
change trading techniques and receive real time investment advice
from Park regarding when to buy stocks.4 2 Park also posts some of his
stock picks on the public portion of his website as well as other public
Internet message boards.43 Neither Park nor S.A. has ever registered
as an investment adviser or broker-dealer.
The SEC alleged that Park had engaged in a scheme to defraud
S.A. members. Specifically, he engaged in an activity knows as "scalp-
ing," in which he profited by purchasing stocks, issuing recommenda-
tions to buy to S.A. members, and then selling his stock into the
buying flurry resulting from trading activity of such members. He
failed to disclose his position in the stocks that he recommended and
his intent to sell while S.A. members bought and caused prices to rise.
He often issued limit orders within minutes of issuing a buy recom-
mendation to S.A. members.44 In addition, in order to attract S.A.
members he issued false performance results that included hypotheti-
cal trades he did not make, inaccurately reported his actual trades,
reported actual losses as winning trades, and failed to list all trades
and recommendations, including losing trades. 45 Finally, the govern-
ment alleged Park engaged in "touting," by recommending stock in ex-
change for receipt of stock or other compensation from the issuer,
information not disclosed to S.A. members. The SEC claimed that
Park had violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
39. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 1, United States Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Gun Soo
Oh Park, a/k/a Tokyo Joe, and Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d
889, (N.D. Ill. 2000) (No. 00C 0049) [hereinafter Complaint].
40. See Stuart Bressman, SEC Goes After Guru "Tokyo Joe," E-Securities, 2 No. 6
ESECURITY 1, (Feb. 2000).
41. See Complaint, supra note 39, at 6.
42. See id.; see also, Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme, General Membership FAQ, at
http'//www.tokyojoe.comjoinfaql.shtml (last visited May 31, 2002).
43. See Complaint, supra note 39, at 7.
44. See id. at 7-12.
45. See id. at 12-14.
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("1934 Act") and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section 17(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), with respect to the alleged touting activity
only, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 ("Advisers Act"). The government sought a permanent injunc-
tion and ancillary relief in the form of disgorgement (plus interest)
and civil money penalties.46
Unlike many of the other enforcement actions involving Internet
securities fraud brought by the SEC, this case was not settled immedi-
ately. Instead, Park and S.A. moved to dismiss the complaint. With
respect to the Advisers Act claims, they argued that such Act was in-
applicable to them since neither was an "investment adviser," not hav-
ing given personalized investment advice to on-line subscribers.47
The defendants also argued that the antifraud provisions of such Act
should not be applied because their rights under the First Amendment
would be violated. With respect to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims under the 1934 Act relating to the alleged omissions of mate-
rial fact only, the defendants argued that the SEC failed to allege a
duty to disclose.48 They also argued that any misstatements made
were not "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities, a re-
quired element for a finding of liability, because they did not provide
personalized investment advice.49 In addition, the defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to plead fraud with
particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.50
The court denied Tokyo Joe's motion.51 It held that the govern-
ment had alleged facts sufficient to establish that the defendants were
"investment advisers" under the Advisers Act and could be subject to
the antifraud provisions of that Act without violating their rights
under the First Amendment.52 Regarding the Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 material omissions claims, the court noted that, while an "in-
vestment adviser" may have an Advisers Act duty to disclose his scalp-
ing it is unclear whether this duty extends to 1934 Act disclosures,
where a duty to disclose must stem from a relationship outside securi-
ties law.53 The court then found that Tokyo Joe may have had a duty
46. See id. at 17-18.
47. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3,
United States Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Gun Soo Oh Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889
(N.D. 111. 2000) (No. 00C 0049) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss].
48. See id. at 12.
49. See id. at 5.
50. See id. at 24.
51. See District Judge Charles P. Kocoras Memorandum Opinion at 3, United States
Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Gun Soo Oh Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(No. OOC 0049) [hereinafter Opinion].
52. See id.
53. See id.
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to disclose his scalping activity because it is possible that he estab-
lished a relationship of "trust and confidence" with users of his web-
site through his daily communications with them.54 Finally, the court
stated that the misstatements were "in connection with" the purchase
or sale of securities because the defendant hyped the stock in anticipa-
tion of a price increase and there was a marked increase in activity of
the shares thereafter. 5 5 Moreover, the requirement was satisfied be-
cause it could be expected that the advisees would act on the advice
and purchase shares.5 6
The defendants appealed the decision, which was dismissed by the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.57 In March of 2001,
the defendants settled the case with the SEC by consenting to the en-
try of an order permanently enjoining them from violating the an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and requiring
disgorgement and payment of civil money penalties.5 8 In addition, the
defendants agreed to post on their website a hyperlink to the court
order for a period of thirty days.5 9
Although the Tokyo Joe litigation did not result in a decision on the
merits, and therefore no judicial opinion on the substance of the SEC's
case, it does provide some insight into SEC policy on Internet fraud
and the legal theories available under the current regulatory regime
to support such an enforcement action. An examination of such theo-
ries reveals certain flaws, suggesting the need for legal reform.
A. Section 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act
Park has consistently taken the position that he is not an invest-
ment adviser under the Advisers Act and is therefore not required to
register with the SEC. Posted on the Tokyo Joe website is extensive
disclaimer language addressing just that issue, including statements
that S.A. is not registered as an investment adviser or broker dealer,
that all statements are opinions of Tokyo Joe and should not be
viewed as solicitations to buy, sell, or hold, and that investors should
not rely on information provided on the website, but should use such
information merely as a "starting point" for doing their own re-
54. See id.
55. See id. at 1.
56. See id.
57. See N.D. Ill., Civil Docket for Case #00-CV-49, #49, United States Sec. and Exch.
Comm. v. Gun Soo Oh Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (2000). The grounds for dismissal
was lack of jurisdiction.
58. See SEC Settles Securities Fraud Action Against "Tokyo Joe," SEC Release No.
2001-26 (Mar. 8, 2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2001-26.txt (last visited
May 31, 2002).
59. See id.
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search.60 Moreover, the disclaimers include several statements dis-
closing the facts that Park and S.A. may be holding shares of stock
prior to mentioning such stock on the website and intend to sell such
shares, without further notice, if there is a sharp price rise.61 The
website also states that Park does not hype stock over his website, but
rather uses fundamental research analysis in making his picks.62
However, based on the plain meaning of the definition in the Ad-
visers Act, it is at least arguable that Tokyo Joe and S.A. are invest-
ment advisers. Any person who engages in the business of advising
others, either in face to face conversations or through writings about
the value of securities or the advisability of buying or selling them for
compensation, or who issues analyses or reports concerning securities
for compensation and as part of a regular business, is deemed an in-
vestment adviser and, as a consequence, is required to register with
the SEC and becomes subject to the antifraud and regulatory provi-
sions of the Advisers Act.63 Tokyo Joe, through his S.A. website, pro-
vides advice for a monthly fee to third parties as to the value of
securities and as to the advisability of trading in such securities, both
through the multiple e-mails that he sends to each client daily and
through discussions in the chat room. The wrinkle, however, is that
the advising took place in cyberspace and did not involve either face to
face meetings or conventional forms of written communication.
Certain categories of persons are expressly excluded from the in-
vestment adviser definition, including banks, lawyers, accountants,
engineers, teachers, broker-dealers, publishers of bona fide newspa-
pers, news magazines, or financial publications of general and regular
circulation, and persons advising on the value of government securi-
ties and certain exempt securities.64 Tokyo Joe does not appear to fall
into any of the listed categories. Therefore, absent some other exclu-
sion, Park and S.A. are subject to the Act.65
60. See Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme, Disclaimer, at http//www.tokyojoe.com/dis-
claimers.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
61. Id.
62. See Tokyo Joe Societe Anonyme, About Tokyo Joe's Societe Anonyme, at http'//
www.tokyojoe.com/m-about.shtml (last visited May 31, 2002).
63. See Advisers Act § 202(A)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2001).
64. See Advisers Act § 202(A)(11)(E); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2001).
65. The Advisers Act excludes certain categories of investment advisers from the re-
gistration requirements. Sections 203(b)(3) and 203A(a)(1)(A) are examples. The
first such exclusion applies to any investment adviser who has advised fewer
than fifteen clients within the past year and who does not hold herself out gener-
ally to the public as an investment adviser. It is unlikely that Park could fall
within this exclusion because, through his popular website, he certainly advises
far more than fifteen clients in any one year and holds himself out to the public
generally as an investment adviser willing to serve anyone with a credit card
number. The second exclusion applies to any investment adviser with less than
$25,000,000 of assets under management who is regulated under the law of the
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In the litigation, Park maintained that he and S.A. were not in-
vestment advisers because their advice over the Internet was imper-
sonal and did not provide specific recommendations suitable to each
subscribers' investment objectives. Park denied having any personal
or professional relationship with anyone who subscribed to his web-
site.66 In fact, at one point in a media interview, he explained his
choice of the name S.A. by noting that, for the most part, "I don't know
these people."67 According to the defendants, the Advisers Act was
intended by Congress to regulate only those who were in a fiduciary
relationship with others and not individuals furnishing investment
advice solely by means of publications. 68
In the SEC's view, the defendants fell within the statutory defini-
tion of investment adviser, since they gave individualized investment
advice for a fee through the e-mails sent to subscribers and through
the chat room. 69 Therefore, the defendants could only avoid applica-
tion of the Advisers Act if they were able to establish that they fell
within one of the categories of persons expressly excluded from the
definition. The SEC argued that Park and S.A. did not fall within the
publishers exclusion because their business did not consist of publica-
tion of a bona fide financial newsletter of general and regular circula-
tion.70 The website was not bona fide because it allegedly contained
both false and misleading statements and recommendations in which
Park had a personal financial interest, since he would profit by selling
into the rising market caused by his clients' buying activity. Further-
more, the website was not of general and regular circulation because
recommendations were timed to specific market activity.
There are problems with the arguments of both sides in this case.
On the one hand, Park and S.A. are incorrect in their assertion that
their contacts with the subscribers were entirely impersonal. On the
contrary, Park's subscribers probably felt an attachment to Park
based on their frequent contact with him over the Internet. Indeed,
they trusted him enough to subscribe to the S.A. website and to base
their day trading decisions on Park's recommendations. It is highly
state where she maintains her principal office and place of business. The applica-
bility of this exclusion cannot be determined without obtaining more information
about the applicable state law for Park's operation. If the persons to whom Park
and S.A. are giving advice have at least $25,000,000 in assets, the exclusion will
not apply in any case.
66. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 47, at 6.
67. See John R. Emshwiller, Loved or Not, Joe Park Is an Internet Stock-Trading
Star, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1998, at C1.
68. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 47, at 4.
69. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at
7, United States Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Gun Soo Oh Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (No. 00C 0049) [hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition to Mo-
tion to Dismiss].
70. See id. at 7-9.
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unlikely that they would have continued their subscriptions if they did
not trust him.
On the other hand, the SEC is trying to enforce a provision of the
Advisers Act that does not contemplate the use of computers and In-
ternet connections for delivery of investment advice. The definition
does not mention electronic means of communication and the status of
persons who deliver investment advice through such means rather
than in face to face conversations. With respect to the availability of
the publishers exclusion, electronic publications are not covered at all;
the types of financial publications contemplated by the drafters of that
definition are produced using conventional print media, not electronic
media. Two consequences flow from these deficiencies. First, it is un-
clear whether those who advise others solely through the Internet and
never in geographic space, namely in meetings and through writings
on paper, are covered by the definition. Second, if such persons are
deemed covered by the definition, the availability of the publishers ex-
clusion is also unclear, because Internet investment advisers operate
in a paper free environment. An attempt to label an online stock
picker an investment adviser under the Advisers Act would require
using the process of reasoning by analogy, just as would an effort by
the same person to claim the benefits of the publishers exclusion. As
is apparent from the Tokyo Joe litigation, this exercise is conceptually
difficult because, as discussed in Part IV, the online and offline worlds
are fundamentally different. Park is somewhere in between the con-
ventional investment adviser and the impersonal publisher. The diffi-
culties in interpretation in this case arise in part because he
represents a third category of persons who render advice about invest-
ing and is neither expressly covered nor excluded by the existing regu-
latory scheme.
Complicating the analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in Lowe
v. SEC,71 which both sides in the Tokyo Joe litigation relied upon to
support their respective positions. In that case, the SEC sought to
permanently enjoin publication of financial newsletters by Lowe and
several corporations he controlled, none of whom were registered as
investment advisers. One of the corporations had previously been reg-
istered under the Advisers Act, but its registration had been revoked
due to Lowe's state law convictions for serious misconduct relating to
his investment advisory business. The newsletters in question were
print publications and contained both general commentary about the
securities markets, a discussion of market indicators and investment
strategies, and specific recommendations for buying, selling, or hold-
ing stocks.7 2 The SEC contended that the Lowe group's publishing
activities violated the order revoking the corporation's registration
71. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
72. See id. at 185.
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and prohibiting Lowe from associating with any investment adviser.
The defendants in Lowe argued that the registration requirement vio-
lated their First Amendment rights because it operated as a prior re-
straint on speech.
The Federal district court for the eastern district of New York de-
nied the relief requested by the SEC and the Second Circuit reversed.
Lowe and the other the defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for
review, with the Court certifying the constitutional question of
whether an injunction against the publication and distribution of
Lowe's newsletters was prohibited by the First Amendment. The Su-
preme Court held that the publishers could not be permanently en-
joined from publishing, with the majority opinion justifying its
decision on statutory grounds. Justice Stevens reasoned that the pub-
lishers fell within the exclusion for bona fide publishers of newspapers
of general and regular circulation and therefore were not investment
advisers subject to the registration requirement. 73 In construing the
Advisers Act requirements, the majority distinguished between per-
sonal and impersonal investment advice, noting that this distinction
was necessary to implement Congressional intent. According to the
majority, the legislative history of the Advisers Act indicates that Con-
gress intended to regulate the business of personalized investment ad-
vising, including the incidental activity of related publishing
activities, but did not intend to regulate the press through the licens-
ing of nonpenalized publishing activities. Such line drawing was nec-
essary to accommodate the First Amendment concerns, according to
the majority. By setting forth a statutory basis for its disposition of
the case, the majority stated that it did not need to decide the consti-
tutional issue.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Burger
and Rehnquist, argued that the publishers were investment advisers
but that the registration requirement as applied to these defendants
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 74 Justice White did
not believe that application of the antifraud provisions of the Advisers
Act requiring investment advisory publishers to disclose material
facts, such as their scalping activity, raised the same serious First
Amendment problems as the registration requirement. 75 The Court
has not revisited this issue since Lowe, and, therefore, the constitu-
tional question of whether the investment adviser registration provi-
sions of the Advisers Act constitute an invalid prior restraint is still
open.
Lowe is viewed as preventing SEC enforcement actions seeking to
require Advisers Act registration of publishers of investment newslet-
73. See id. at 204, 207, 211.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 225.
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ters. Prior to Lowe, the SEC had taken the position that the registra-
tion requirements and the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act
were applicable not just to those who gave personalized investment
advice for a fee in face-to-face dealings with clients but also to those
who rendered impersonal investment advice exclusively through in-
vestment advisory reports or newsletters.7 6 The federal courts con-
curred in such interpretation.7 7 Since Lowe, the SEC has ceased
bringing registration enforcement actions against those who are pub-
lishers of such investment newsletters. In the Tokyo Joe litigation,
the SEC sought only to enforce the antifraud provisions of the Advis-
ers Act, ignoring the registration requirement completely, even
though it is arguable that Tokyo Joe and S.A. should be required to
register.
Lowe has been the subject of much commentary, none of which,
however, is more insightful and cogent than Justice White's dissent-
ing opinion.7 8 The majority opinion has muddied the waters sur-
rounding investment adviser regulation because it appears to hold as
a matter of law that, regardless of the text of the publishers exclusion
in the definition of investment adviser, Congress intended to exclude
all nonpersonalized publishing activities from the regulatory scope of
the Advisers Act.7 9 This reading widens the scope of the publishers
exclusion beyond the SEC's historic interpretation of that provision
and appears to sweep in all publications. It does not give meaningful
guidance as to whether a particular publication might fail to meet the
bona fide and general and regular circulation standards.
In addition, the SEC's enforcement program for investment ad-
viser fraud appears to be hampered as a result of Lowe. As Justice
White noted in his concurrence, the majority's opinion presumptively
overrules the Supreme Court's earlier decision in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc.S0 In that decision, the Court held that
76. See Lani M. Lee, The Effects of Lowe on the Application of the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment Advisory Publications, 42 Bus. LAw. 507
(1987).
77. See SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F. 2d 1371, 1377-1379 (2d Cir. 1970)
(stating that court will look at whether the objective was to assist subscribers in
forming investment judgments and decisions and not only at whether publication
exhibits purely formal indicia of a newspaper; bona fide determination requires
differentiating between merchandising activities and publication of expression
which is beyond the Advisers Act's regulatory purposes). The majority in Lowe
criticized this decision as "recasting the statutory language without even men-
tioning the apparent intent of Congress to keep the Act free of constitutional in-
firmities." See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 207.
78. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA.
L. REv. 223, 293-305 (1990); Lee, supra note 76, at 530-537; Nicholas Wolfson,
The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CoNN. L. REv. 265, 290-296 (1988).
79. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 204-208.
80. See id. at 224-226
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scalping by the publisher of an investment newsletter offering only
impersonal investment advice was actionable under the antifraud pro-
visions of the Advisers Act.S1 Because Lowe held that the Advisers
Act was not intended to cover nonpersonalized investment advice, it
can be argued that not just the registration provision, but also the
antifraud provisions should not be applicable to such persons. If Capi-
tal Gains is no longer good law, it is arguable that the SEC can never
prosecute publishers of investment newsletters under such antifraud
provisions.8 2
In SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute, Inc., a case involving an
unregistered investment adviser allegedly engaged in fraudulent ac-
tivities in violation of the Advisers Act, the SEC took the position that
Lowe does not preclude antifraud enforcement under the Advisers Act
against non-bona fide investment newsletter publishers, such as those
who are found to have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Sec-
tion 17(b) of the 1933 Act, and therefore not engaging in disinterested
commentary.8 3 The court in that case never reached the merits of this
argument. Since Lowe, however, other lower federal courts have
weighed in on the question. An example is SEC v. Suter, a Seventh
Circuit case in which Judge Posner dismissed an appeal of a district
court ruling denying the lifting of injunctive relief under the Advisers
Act based on fraudulent activity against a publisher of financial news-
letters, relief that had been granted prior to Lowe.8 4 Judge Posner
distinguished Lowe on the basis that the publisher in that case was
engaged in publishing newsletters full time, did not trade in the secur-
ities discussed in the newsletter, and was not accused of violating the
1933 Act.85 He noted that "[a] person engaged in securities fraud can-
not obtain immunity by the simple expedient of publishing an invest-
ment newsletter." Suter leaves open the possibility that a non-bona
fide publisher of investment newsletters may not be covered by the
ruling in Lowe with respect to fraud enforcement proceedings.
Park demonstrates once again the conceptual difficulties involved
in determining whether advising activities fall within the Advisers
Act regulatory structure. The issues that have been discussed arose
in the context of advisers who claimed the benefit of the publishers
exclusion based upon their use of print media to disseminate invest-
ment advice. Added to the preexisting lack of clarity in the definition
81. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
82. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3367 (3d ed. 1991).
83. See SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Institute, Inc., 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
SEC's litigation position and the history of the case is described in Lee, supra
note 76, at 546.
84. See SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1987).
85. See id. at 991.
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of investment adviser are the additional problems that exist because
of the use of the Internet as the medium of communication.
First, the definition of investment adviser does not encompass
those who give only online advice, as opposed to those using face to
face meetings or print publications. This was not viewed as a barrier
in Park. However, it is a gap in the regulatory structure that needs to
be filled. Second, it is unclear what type of publication qualifies for
the publishers exclusion, whether online or offline. The SEC proposed
a statutory amendment in 1986, which was intended to preserve its
enforcement rights with respect to non-bona fide publishers. The
amendment, which would have refined the publishers exclusion, was
never adopted.86 The need is all the more pressing now because of the
increased activity in advising activities over the Internet. Such an
amendment, updated to include the Internet as a form of communica-
tion media, seems necessary in order to give market participants
greater certainty and adequate notice of the regulatory effect of their
actions, as well as furthering the SEC's goal of preserving its statutory
mandate to enforce the Advisers Act.
Based on the current state of the law, the SEC's case against Tokyo
Joe and S.A. was not watertight. While the SEC's complaint survived
a motion to dismiss, Park might have been able to establish that he
was not an investment adviser had the case been tried. Part IV of this
Article will explore an alternative approach to the regulatory issue
that takes into account the nature of investment advising in cyber-
space and attempts to fill the gap left by existing law.
B. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act
In addition to prosecuting Park's alleged scalping activity under
the Advisers Act antifraud provisions, the SEC also claimed that such
activity violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereun-
der.8 7 The theory underlying this claim is that scalping is a form of
insider trading activity. It involves a material omission of fact,
namely that the alleged fraudster stands to gain from his recommen-
86. The SEC's proposed text would have amended the definition to include all forms
of communications media and to replace the publishers exclusion with an exclu-
sion for newspaper publishers, radio and television station operators, or opera-
tors of other communications media that are not principally a vehicle for
providing advice, analyses or reports on the value of securities or the advisability
of investing in, purchasing or selling such securities. See Lee, supra note 76, at
549-550.
87. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 69, at 17-19.
The SEC also claimed that defendants violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
based on alleged misrepresentations and half-truths. See id. at 16-17. However,
those claims will not be addressed.
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dation, which omission constitutes fraud under the statute and rule.88
The defendants argued that liability based on such a claim can be im-
posed only where a duty of disclosure exists.8 9 A duty to disclose
arises only if the parties have a fiduciary or other similar relationship
of trust and confidence. The defendants claimed that they owed no
duty of disclosure to the S.A. subscribers because they were not in a
fiduciary relationship with them.
Typically, scalping claims involve investment advisers and are
prosecuted under the Advisers Act. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether fail-
ure to disclose scalping satisfied the fraud or deceit requirement of
Section 206. The Court interpreted the provision liberally, taking into
account the remedial purposes of the Advisers Act-fostering full dis-
closure and raising the level of business ethics in the securities indus-
try-as well as the legislative history's characterization of investment
as one of trust and confidence requiring strict limitations on the rights
of advisers to engage in securities transactions that could conflict with
their clients' interests.90 The Court held that failure to disclose scalp-
ing constituted fraud even in a case where no material misstatements
were made. 9 '
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Capital Gains suggests that un-
disclosed scalping could violate Rule 10b-5's prohibition against acts
and practices that operate as a fraud or deceit.92 This reasoning was
used by the court in Zweig v. Hearst Corporation,93 the leading case
on the use of Rule 10b-5 to prosecute scalping. That case involved a
financial columnist who bought stock at a discount price from the is-
suer shortly before publishing a buy recommendation in his column.
The stock rapidly increased in value upon publication and the defen-
dant sold part of his holdings at a profit. The court found the defen-
dant had violated the rule because he used his column as part of a
scheme to manipulate the market and deceive the investing public.94
The court's rationale was based upon the same type of duty analysis
used by the Supreme Court in Capital Gains, namely that the finan-
cial columnist in question had a duty to disclose his conflict of interest.
88. See Elliot J. Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 80, 89 (1969).
89. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 47, at 13-15. De-
fendants also claimed that their advice was not "in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security," another requirement for a finding of fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. at 16. However, that issue will not be addressed.
90. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186-187, 190 (1963).
91. See id. at 196-197.
92. See id. at 194; see also THoMAs L. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 10.9
(3d. ed. 1995).
93. See 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. See id. at 1271.
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The breach of that duty constituted omission of a material fact in vio-
lation of Rule 10b-5.95
In Park, the SEC relied on Capital Gains and Zweig to establish
that the defendants' failure to disclose their scalping activity violated
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The defendants relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States.9 6 to call into question
the duty analysis used in Zweig. Chiarella was not a scalping case but
rather involved a criminal conviction under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of a financial printer who traded on inside information obtained
in the course of his employment by buying stock of target companies
that he knew to be the subject of impending tender offers and then
selling his shares at a profit after the takeover became public informa-
tion. The Supreme Court held that Chiarella could not be held liable
based on the classic theory of insider trading. He had no affirmative
disclosure duty to tell selling shareholders of the target company of
the tender offer because he had had no prior dealings with them, was
neither their agent or fiduciary and was not a person in whom they
had placed trust and confidence but rather dealt with them only
through impersonal market transactions. 97 Chiarella stands for the
proposition that there can be no finding of fraud in a material omis-
sions case absent a duty to speak and such duty only arises when one
party has information that the other party is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween them.98
The continued vitality of Zweig given the Supreme Court's decision
in Chiarella is questionable.9 9 The Supreme Court has never held
that scalping is actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. How-
ever, in Lowe, Justice Stevens noted, in discussing Justice White's dis-
cussion of the majority decision's implicit overruling of Capital Gains,
that other federal statutes including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and
the mail fraud statute, are available to prosecute scalping claims, in
addition to the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act.oo
In one post-Chiarella case, a lower federal court accepted the use of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prosecute scalping violations by an
investment adviser. In SEC v Blavin, a federal district court found a
violation of Rule 10b-5 where a publisher of financial newsletters rec-
ommending the purchase and sale of securities, who the court found to
be an investment adviser who was unregistered in violation of the Ad-
visers Act, failed to disclose scalping activity and also allegedly made
95. See id. at 1268.
96. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
97. See id. at 232-33.
98. See id. at 235, 228.
99. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 82, at 3648-3653.
100. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209 n.56.
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
various material misstatements in such newsletters.101 This leaves
open the possibility that the use of Rule 10b-5 for scalping violations is
a viable theory, at least in some federal circuits, for those who owe
fiduciary duties due to their status as investment advisers.
Given the current state of the legal doctrine in this area, the Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim against Tokyo Joe and S.A. could have
succeeded only if the SEC had been able to establish that such defend-
ants stood in a fiduciary relationship to the S.A. subscribers. Even if
Zweig did survive Chiarella, an argument made by the SEC that the
district court in Park accepted, Zweig standing by itself seems inappo-
site to Park for it involved impersonal financial publications, a status
that Park and S.A. would have great difficulty establishing. Blavin
holds, however, that such a cause of action may be maintained even
after Chiarella if fiduciary duties like those owed by an investment
adviser can be found. Part IV of this Article will propose an alterna-
tive theory on which the requisite finding of fiduciary duty on the part
of Park might be based.
Even if the duty analysis suggested by the preceding discussion is
not viable, the misappropriation theory may be available for cases like
Park.102 In Carpenter v. U.S.,103 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction of R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal reporter who traded
in advance of recommendations made in his Heard on the Street col-
umn, and a group of co-conspirators, for violations of the federal wire
fraud statute and Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit upheld the convic-
tions under Rule 10b-5 based upon the misappropriation theory of in-
sider trading.iO4 An evenly divided Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions under Rule 10b-5 without opinion. 05 Any doubts about
the availability of the misappropriation theory for scalping violations
due to the failure of a majority of the Court to affirm on that basis may
101. See SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 (E.D. Mich. 1983), affd 760 F.2d 706
(6th Cir. 1985); see also Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 833
(1990) (acknowledging that an investment adviser was a fiduciary who is re-
quired to disclose conflicts of interest for the purpose of assessing liability under
Rule 10b-5).
102. The misappropriation theory extends liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
to persons who are not covered under the so-called classic theory, which is pre-
mised upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship with the company whose
shares are being traded. It is premised upon obtaining an informational advan-
tage obtained through unlawful means, including outright theft or use of infor-
mation for personal advantage that was supplied for business use only. The
misappropriator is deemed to have breached a duty to the source of the informa-
tion. Identified by Justice Burger in his dissent in Chiarella, the theory was later
accepted by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan. See Loss & SELIG-
mAN, supra note 82, vol. VIII at 3631-3653.
103. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
104. See U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
105. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23-24.
[Vol. 80:920
SECURITIES FRAUD IN CYBERSPACE
be overcome by the Supreme Court's later acceptance of the misappro-
priation theory in the context of insider trading violations in United
States v. O'Hagan.lO6 However, there is some question as to whether
this theory could be applied to an Internet website operator that is
itself the source of the published information. Unlike Carpenter, who
was deemed to have misappropriated inside information regarding the
contents of an upcoming column from the newspaper publisher itself,
Park and S.A. cannot be said to have misappropriated the information
from another party.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE
REGULATORY ISSUE
The legal problems identified in the prior section-namely the
doubtful applicability of Section 206 of the Advisers Act and Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act to the scalping activity of Tokyo
Joe and S.A.-turn on the issue of whether fiduciary duties can arise
in cyberspace. In the case of the Advisers Act, the antifraud provi-
sions apply only to those deemed investment advisers. The personal-
ized, face-to-face nature of the conventional investment advisory
relationship has been characterized as fiduciary in nature, and the
failure to disclose scalping activity as a breach of duties arising in that
context. In the case of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act as
applied to scalping activities, which involve omissions of material fact,
it is necessary to find a fiduciary duty to speak before remaining silent
constitutes fraud.
Based upon the Conventions of the pre-cyberspace world, in which
human relationships develop over time through repeated contacts in
geographic space, it is doubtful that Tokyo Joe and S.A. owed fiduciary
duties to their subscribers because their relationship did not arise in
geographic space. However, it may be possible to develop a conceptual
framework that could support the existence of fiduciary duties in
cyberspace. Such a framework might serve as an alternative basis for
a finding of fraud liability in cases like the Tokyo Joe litigation. In
order to do this, it becomes necessary to examine the nature of human
interactions over the Internet.
Such an inquiry must begin by viewing the Internet as not simply
a tool for information gathering, but as an environment. 0 7 It
presents a new context for human interaction separate and distinct
from geographic space. If the Internet is approached from this
broader perspective, one can begin to reconceptualize the nature of
human relationships in the context of cyberspace. Such reconceptual-
ization can lead one to conclude that it is possible to develop a rela-
106. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
107. See M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WoRLD 115, 118 (1995).
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tionship with someone over the Internet. We have all heard stories
about people developing close personal friendships, even falling in
love, through e-mail exchanges or through conversations in a chat
room. We also know that many business transactions, from electronic
banking to sales of products to securities trading, take place over In-
ternet websites on a daily basis. Each of these interactions, to a
greater or lesser extent, is based on the concept of trust. Given the
right set of circumstances, including frequent and successful contact
over an extended period of time, it is not too far a stretch to imagine
that use of an Internet website, like S.A. in the Park case, could give
rise to a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the
website operator.
A number of commentators have suggested that virtual communi-
ties exist in cyberspace.iOS A virtual or online community has been
described as a gathering place for a new form of social interaction in
which people form bonds based on common interests rather than geo-
graphic proximity.i0 9 The exact nature of such communities has not
been established, but some broad concepts can be drawn from the
available literature. First, virtual communities are characterized by
their interactive nature. Internet users not only receive information
but give up information. It is this key feature of the new medium that
makes the Internet a communication tool, permitting users to ex-
change information and viewpoints.110 In fact, it is the human need
for interaction with others with shared interests that forms the basis
for online communities.i 1n Far from being a medium that fosters ano-
nymity, the Internet fosters the formation of social communities that
share some of the same characteristics as communities based on phys-
ical proximity.
Second, virtual communities give rise to feelings of trust and com-
mitment among its members.11 2 This characteristic is the glue that
holds virtual communities together and keeps its members coming
back for more. The importance of trust in the virtual community has
been recognized in both the commercial and noncommercial
context.ii 3
108. For a discussion of the nature of virtual communities from a firsthand observer,
see HOwARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELEC-
TRONIc FRONTIER (1993), available at http'//www.rheingold.comvclbook (visited
October 2, 2001). For a social science perspective, see COMMUNITIES IN CYBER-
SPACE (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999).
109. See ANDREw L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 48-49 (1999).
110. See KATSH, supra note 107, at 108.
111. See CLIFF ALLEN ET AL., INTERNET GUIDE TO ONE-ON-ONE WEB MIARKETING 160-
163 (1998).
112. See JOHN HAGEL III & ARTHUR G. ARMSTRONG, NET GAIN: ExPANDING MARKETS
THROUGH VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES, at xi (1995).
113. For a description of trusting in the noncommercial context, see RHEINGOLD, supra
note 108, ch. 2. For a discussion of legal issues surrounding trust over the In-
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While virtual communities initially arose in a noncommercial con-
text, the concept of a commercial online community has been identi-
fied and discussed in both business and commercial law literature.1 1 4
In a study of Internet marketing, Hagel and Armstrong identified five
defining elements of virtual communities in the business context: 1) a
distinctive focus; 2) the provision of a broad range of published content
combined with communication capacity of such content by members
through bulletin boards, real-time chat rooms, and e-mails; 3) oppor-
tunities for exchange of member-generated content; 4) the provision of
access to competing publishers and vendors; and 5) organization as a
profit-making commercial enterprise."i 5 According to Hagel and Arm-
strong, it is this profit incentive that will shape the evolution of vir-
tual communities by members rewarding organizers of virtual
communities that deliver attractive financial returns.1 1 6 Regarding
the second element, Hagel and Armstrong suggest that there are cer-
tain duties that are owed by the organizer to the members-namely
commitment to quality content by organizer prescreening and organiz-
ing information and certification of authenticity and qualifications of
members providing such information."i 7 Hagel and Armstrong argue
that the profit motive will create new forms of virtual communities
whose strong commercial element will enhance and expand the basic
requirements of community-trust and commitment."38
In the Park case, it is arguable that the S.A. website gave rise to
formation of a commercial virtual community composed of day trad-
ers. Four of the indicia of a commercial online community outlined by
Hagel and Armstrong can be identified in the operation of the S.A.
website, namely a focus on the highly particularized activity of day
trading, the provision a broad range of information regarding both
trading opportunities and strategies combined with an opportunity for
member discussions of such content among each other and with Park
through the chat room, opportunities for members to express their
views not only in the chat room but also through use of the bulletin
board, and organization as a profit-making venture. Only the element
of affording access to competing providers of such services is not pre-
sent. This fact does not undermine the analysis because Hagel and
Armstrong note that not all five indicia need to be present to form a
virtual community, although the greater the number of indicia pre-
sent, the more a community will thrive.
ternet in a commercial context, see Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting
on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REv. 457 (2001).
114. See CLIFF ALLEN Er AL., supra note 111; -AGEL & ARMSTONG, supra note 112;
Frankel, supra note 113.
115. See BAGEL & ARMSTRONG, supra note 112, at 8-10.
116. See id. at 9.
117. See id. at 29.
118. See id. at xi.
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The implication of a finding that a virtual community arose is the
recognition that the members and Park developed personalized rela-
tionships giving rise to feelings of trust and commitment. While Park
maintained in the litigation that he gave no personalized advice tai-
lored to specific individuals or their portfolios, such testimony is con-
tradicted by the fact that all members of the community by definition
had similar trading objectives and interests. If a virtual community
characterized by trust and commitment did exist, one can argue that
Park owed a type of fiduciary duty to the S.A. subscribers. Hagel and
Armstrong suggest that organizers of an online community owe a duty
to the members to guarantee quality content. Applying that principle
to the context of the S.A. community, Park could be said to have a duty
to refrain from distributing content tainted by his own conflict of in-
terest, namely engaging in scalping without specific disclosures of his
interest in a particular stock at the time of making a recommendation.
Such an analysis solves two conceptual problems involving the Ad-
visers Act raised in the Tokyo Joe litigation. First, it clarifies the sta-
tus of Park and S.A. as investment advisers. While he did in a sense
"publish" his opinions, as well as other more generic information on
trading strategies, over the Internet, he cannot claim to be a publisher
of a bona fide financial publication of general and regular circulation.
He gave personalized advice specifically tailored to the needs of the
day traders who subscribed to the S.A. website. In addition, if one can
conclude that as an organizer of a virtual community he owed certain
duties to its members, one can further conclude that through his
scalping activity he breached that duty, thereby giving rise to possible
fraud liability under Section 206 of the Advisers Act. In addition,
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, he can be said to have breached
his duties to disclose his scalping as well, duties that stem from his
fiduciary relationship with his subscribers.
Park's own characterization of his relationship with his subscrib-
ers is based upon a world view that does not hold true in cyberspace.
He appears to view distribution of content over the Internet as the
equivalent of print publishing, which it is not. He is certainly not an
investment adviser in the conventional sense because he does not hold
face-to-face meetings with clients in the sense of being in physical
proximity with them. However, he does meet with them daily in
cyberspace through a combination of his e-mails, chat room conversa-
tions, and bulletin board postings. Indeed, it is highly likely that he
had more personal contact with customers than do many registered
and regulated investment advisers. Park was wrong to name his web-
site Societe Anonyme; he should have called it Societe Intime.
The analysis set forth is not the end of the inquiry, but rather the
beginning of a new way of looking at online investment advisory rela-
tionships. Additional work will need to be undertaken in order to clar-
[Vol. 80:920
SECURITIES FRAUD IN CYBERSPACE
ify whether this new look is valid and how it works in individual cases.
One view of how online communities arise is presented, but there may
be other, alternative views that need to be explored. The conditions
under which fiduciary duties arise in cyberspace, as well as the nature
and extent of such duties, could be further refined. Whether this
framework can be extended to other cyberspace contexts impacting se-
curities regulation is another possible avenue for further inquiry. Fi-
nally, there is the question of how the courts will respond. The
concept of a virtual community as the basis for legal liability is not yet
established in our jurisprudence, but perhaps its day will come.
There are, no doubt, other possible solutions to the regulatory issue
raised in this Article and to the problem of Internet fraud generally.
Some commentators have floated such ideas already. John Coffee has
raised the possibility of imposing a gatekeeper function on operators
of chat rooms where fraudulent statements are sometimes posted and
acted upon by investors. 119 Such gatekeepers, who include the major
online service providers who sponsor such chat rooms, might be
charged with the responsibility of deleting postings sent by anony-
mous remailers. David Johnson and David Post have suggested that
members of an online community as well as service providers, both of
whom have an interest in preserving the safety and integrity of cyber-
space, could play a regulatory role by developing a self-governance
system.120 I will leave these solutions to be addressed on another oc-
casion, along with other proposals on combating Internet securities
fraud that no doubt will be developed as we continue our travels
through this new place called cyberspace.
119. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1226.
120. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STA L. REv. 1367, 1383, 1388 (1996).
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